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York: The Free Press, 1965. Pp. xxxviii, 1229. $17.50.
".. . I observed here and there many in the Habit of Servants,
with a blown bladder fastened like a Flail to the End of a short
Stick, which they carried in their Hands.... With these Bladders
they now and then flapped the Mouths and Ears of those who stood
near them, of which Practice I could not then conceive the Mean-
ing. It seems, the Minds of these People are so taken up with
intense Speculations, that they neither can speak, or attend to the
Discourses of others, without being rouzed by some external Tac-
tion upon the Organs of Speech and Hearing; for which Reason,
those persons who are able to afford it, always keep a Flapper...
in their Family, as one of their Domesticks; nor ever walk abroad
or make Visits without him. And the Business of this Officer is,
when two or more Persons are in Company, gently to strike with
his Bladder the Mouth of him who is to speak, and the Right
Ear of him or them to whom the Speaker addresseth himself....
"The Women of the Island have abundance of Vivacity; they con-
temn their Husbands, and are exceedingly fond of Strangers....
Among these the Ladies chuse their Gallants: But the Vexation is,
that they act with too much Ease and Security; for the Husband
is always so wrapped in Speculation, that the Mistress and Lover
may proceed to the greatest Familiarities before his Face, if he
be but provided with Paper and Implements, and without his
Flapper at his Side."'
If Lemuel Gulliver were condemned to continue his wanderings and
could not again find the floating island of Laputa, the world of Anglo-
American family law would provide a fit substitute. Judges and lawyers
for the most part appear to proceed in a legal world of their own,
shaping doctrine to their taste but totally oblivious of the actual results,
if any, of their labors. Meanwhile, though it may not be with "too
much Ease and Security," the actors to whom the speculations of the
men of the law supposedly relate go about their coupling, procreating
and parting pretty much as they will. Fortunately, however, we may
be experiencing a Flapper era which will bring our profession back to
earth as a participant in the actual processes of forming societies and
families. The Family and the Law is a major contribution to the
1. SwiFr, GULLIVER'S TRAVELs 124, 129-130 (Modem Library ed. 1958).
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achievement of this, as its predecessor volume on criminal law is in
that field.
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To the reviewer, traditional domestic relations law embodies a series
of assumptions:
(1) The marriage ceremony is a magic ritual which somehow pro-
duces visible and ineradicable changes in its principal figures.
(2) The essence of marriage is the union of penis and vagina,
preferably for purposes of procreation. That these organs happen to be
attached to people is purely incidental.
(3) This predominantly genital union is not to be legally broken
up until one of the parties is clearly shown to be "at fault." If there is
relative equality of either fault or faultlessness, the union must remain
unbroken.
(4) Property and monetary payments are to be administered as
rewards to the good and chastisement to the bad.
(5) Children are indeed creatures, whose lives are the proprietary
interests of those who conceived and bore them. Therefore, only the
race, blood, heredity and religion of the parents are relevant factors
in determining the placement and career of the child.
(6) Legal doctrines are effective devices to shape human conduct.
When the law speaks, human actors will immediately conform their
conduct to the law's expectations.
(7) All organs of government must order their activities as the
judges would have them do. Those who are married are married for
all purposes. Those who are not married are not married for all pur-
poses. Those who are illegitimate are illegitimate for all purposes. And
so forth.
If these assumptions are correct, then all relevant data can be tidily
allocated under the legal categories of Marriage, Annulment, Divorce,
Defenses to Divorce, Allocation of Property, Adoption and Illegitimacy.
A logically impeccable hierarchy of legal propositions can be structured,
and society will be ordered in a corresponding fashion. But if all
or most of these assumptions are wrong or substantially defective, then
the law and its processes become increasingly irrelevant, and society
continues on its way unaffected in its evolution. The only losers are the
relatively small band of unfortunates who for a time at least are
hampered by judicial intervention in accomplishing immediately what
they almost certainly will accomplish eventually.
The Family and the Law is a rich sourcebook for anyone who is
ready to re-examine the traditional assumptions of the law. In the first
2. DONNELLY, GoLDsTEN & ScsmwvARz, CRIN,,N'A.. LAw (1962).
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place, its organization of materials forces one to abandon the legal
categories of classification so beloved of compiler, digester and casebook
editor. The book is arranged in three major segments. The first is an
introduction to the family law process. This process is no longer
viewed according to legal classifications like marriage, annulment, di-
vorce and the like, but in terms of functional stages by which a family
unit forms itself, sustains itself and perhaps dissolves itself. The four
stages or processes are (a) establishment of the husband-wife relation-
ship in the first place, (b) "administration"8 and reorganization of that
relationship once it is established, (c) administration and reorganiza-
tion of the relationship between parents and child after the child is on
the scene, and (d) administration of both kinds of relationships after
they have been reorganized. To observe these several processes of course
brings one to the definitional problem of what is a "family." This is the
subject matter of the fifth part of Chapter I. Moreover, whenever
law enters the picture the state is acting. Part Six, therefore, considers
the role of the state in establishing, administering, reorganizing and
once again administering the family unit.
The first chapter thus examines simultaneously both husband-wife
and parent-child relationships. Chapter II looks only at spousal inter-
action within a two-fold structural organization. The wife-husband
relation is once more viewed according to the transitional stages of
establishing that relation, administering it once it is formed, reorga-
nizing it and administering it again once it has been reorganized, But
there is now added the question of the degree to which certain other
factors are or ought to be taken into consideration at each functional
phase.
The first is "economic gratification." 4 At the stage of formation of
the husband-wife relationship this is primarily a matter of how gifts
and other acquisitions are to be distributed if the nascent relationship
aborts. During the existence of the consummated relationship it com-
prehends matters like incurring and discharging consumer debts, ac-
quiring and sharing property interests, and providing support. In re-
organization it appears sometimes as a basis for invoking official action,
as in an instance of nonsupport, but more often in the guise of disputes
over property division and the proper level of support payments. In
3. "We had difficulty finding a relatively neutral term for problems concerned witit
the function of the state in nourishing, undermining, controlling, maintaining, regulating,
and supervising existing and persisting "legal" family relationships. The term "adminis-
tration" seems to fulfill the need and, at the same time, stimulate-without limiting-




administering the reorganized unit it manifests itself chiefly as a ques-
tion of contesting, and perhaps modifying, the financial arrangements
earlier arrived at and of enforcing the rulings as entered.
The second factor is the relevance of sexual gratification at each
stage.5 It is in this context that one truly encounters a judicial chamber
of horrors, a mixture of taboo, prudery, moral crusading and spiritual
uplift that would provoke laughter if it were not for the human hard-
ship which it produces. Sexual gratification also bears a close relation to
what is treated in The Family and the Law as "procreative gratifica-
tion"; 6 judicial attitudes toward sex are almost certain to be carried
through into evaluation of contraception and sterilization.
The other major factor considered in Chapter II is what the editors
call "being healthy, happy and respected."7 Much of the content of this
portion relates to the significance of mental illness at the four operative
stages of family evolution. Other interesting aspects, however, include
interracial marriage relationships, the issue of consent in marriage,
and the question of the ability of courts to intervene to authorize
medical treatment for one whose religious beliefs do not permit some
or all medical aid.
Chapter III picks up for independent consideration the "vertical"
relationships in the family unit discussed and defined in Chapter I,
and not primarily the "lateral" spousal relationship of Chapter II. The
first portion lines out goals and guides for state intervention to govern
parent-child relationships. The comprehensive statutes of California
are set forth in full as a sample of a legislative statement. A competing(?)
set of standards from psychoanalysis and psychology is next presented
for comparison. The second part then proceeds to tie some of these
matters down. There is first a consideration of the relevance to the
parent-child relation of traumatic injury. One form of injury is of
course physical abuse and neglect by a parent. Another is the fact of
divorce itself, when actual care of the child devolves perhaps into the
hands not of a relative but of school administrators or domestics. Also
relevant is the phenomenon of the judicial or administrative proceeding
itself. An untreated physical defect may, according to circumstances,
amount to trauma. A parent's mental illness can have disastrous effect.
So may the fact that one parent kills the other.
The third part then considers the degree to which continuity in
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adoption. The elements of continuity utilized by the editors embrace
blood, name, color, intellectual and vocational stimulation, financial
security, sibling relationships, sexual identity and law enforcement.
They then provide materials on the procedures by which the continuity
which is felt to be desirable is to be achieved in fact, including the
problem of "black market" adoptions.
The final portion of this chapter presents an aspect which is most
often ignored by lawyers as they consider the family, that of the vertical
interaction of child and elderly parent. In many cultures the aged have
a position within the larger family unit which guarantees them both
status and an outlet for creative activity.$ This is sometimes true in the
United States, though probably on a decreasing scale. When the "large"
family disappears, something must be done with and for the aged.
Parents who can be economically self-sufficient suffer only emotionally
if children sever ties; we can do little by law to alleviate emotional
trauma. But those who are not able to provide their own means of sub-
sistance must be protected by the state, or the community if one prefers
that term, if they are not to perish alone. The Family and the Law
poses the problem primarily in the context of the state versus the child
in a battle over who pays the cost of protecting the parent. Perhaps
this is the only way it can be presented if precedential experience is
needed, for the primary decision for the legislator and ultimately the
taxpayer is whether he is to act at all to alleviate the hardship which
exists unless he acts. His inaction leaves no readily discernable trace.
Even death does not end all problems, as the editors show through
materials on actions by the state against the children for expenses of
care of the aged parent in life and by the children against the under-
taker for mishandling the parent's corpse.
This, then, is the framework of The Family and the Law, the frame-
work which indicates what a major contribution it is to a re-evaluation
of the law's function in affecting family processes. But even this is
not the whole picture. The book abounds in intriguing issues on which
8. Japan is an outstanding example. See, e.g., BEAIWSLEY, HALL & WARD, VILLAGE JAPAN
232-236, 336-343 (1959); DORE, CITY LIFE IN JAPAN 91-120 (1958): Beardsley, Cultural
Anthropology: Prehistoric and Contemporary Aspects, in TwELVE DooRS TO JAPAN 48,
118-19 (Beardsley & Hall ed. 1965); George, Law in Modern Japan, in TwELvE DooRS TO
JAPAN 484, 509-516 (Beardsley & Hall ed. 1965). In the editors' posing of the Communist
Chinese Family Code as a possible pattern for state intervention, the difference in
assumptions underlying Oriental and Occidental family systems is clearly pointed up.
To use Japanese materials for the purpose is even better, however, in that the materials
for comparative study are readily available in Japan, and the Western observer has
freedom to investigate how far code provisions both affect and are affected by the social
and cultural institution of the family.
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legal processes have only begun to touch. One major problem is the
degree to which religious differences are (a) either a cause or a
symptom of the cause of disruption between spouses or between parent
and child, and (b) a matter which the courts or legislature should try
to regulate. While many judges appear to believe they have the answer,
the total impact of the materials gathered here is not so reassuring.
Another is the role of the lawyer as counselor and advocate. The canons
of ethics are at best irrelevant here; more likely they work positive
harm in the field of family law.9 The Family and the Law is at least
a beginning in rethinking the problem of professionalism in family
law contexts. A third is the related but broader problem of the use of
conciliation rather than litigation in domestic disputes and of deter-
mining the role of lawyer and judge in any less structured machinery
which we devise to promote conciliation. A fourth is regulation of one
of the last resorts of quackery, the chaotic category of marriage coun-
seling. A fifth, which relates to the first, is state intervention to require
medical attention for a minor when his own or his parents' religious
beliefs are opposed. A sixth, already mentioned, is the question of
whether the state should be able to require even an adult to have medi-
cal treatment which he requires. A seventh is the procedural(?.) problem
of providing adequate representation for the child whatever the pro-
cedural context by which his future is directly or indirectly affected.
An eighth is what is to most of us the disturbing question of the form
the family might take in the future and the degree of participation in
the reformulation process we are comfortable in permitting the state.
A ninth is alcoholism or other forms of addiction as either causes of
or symptomatic of causes of marital disruptions. A tenth is the role
which artificial insemination can play both in creating and disrupting
family relationships. An eleventh, perhaps converse to the tenth, is
sterilization as form of birth control. A twelfth is the extent to which
policies developed privately by child placement and care agencies auto-
matically become "law" by virtue of unthinking reliance on them by
courts and administrators. A thirteenth is intervention by welfare au-
thorities to disrupt a viable family-type relationship because they view
it as aberrant or deviant because it does not correspond with an offi-
cially-approved stereotype. A fourteenth is legal regulation of under-
taking practices. There are other problems as well; each reader can
9. Counseling, for example, is made difficult or impossible if the attorney abides
strictly by the requirements of Canon 6 (Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests).
Canon 9 (Negotiations With Opposite Party), Canon 19 (Appearance of Lawyer as Witness
for His Client) and Canon 37 (Confidences of a Client).
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devise his own list of intriguing issues. But The Family and the Law
does a service both to law teaching and the legal profession in general
by taking what usually are free-floating problems which catch the
passing fancy of lawyers and, if not mooring them, at least confining
them within the breakwater of a larger concept of the family regulated
and protected by law. As a profession and as a society, we can probably
work out more viable solutions through first setting these isolated
problems in context than by trying to work them out one by one as
they drift into our field of vision.
In the earlier book of which Professor Goldstein is also an editor,
Criminal Law,10 effective use is made of the extended record of a
criminal case which poses almost insoluble problems of criminal law
policy and practice. This is a welcome change from the usual practice
by casebook compilers of adding together bits and snippets from ap-
pellate opinions to make up a book. With that approach one can see
only paper people, if he can see people at all. When a more voluminous
record of a case is available, the people who are the causes of and the
principal actors in litigation come alive, at times quite disturbingly
alive. As this awareness of human participation increases, the reader's
concern for legal abstractions decreases, and legal processes appear less
as controlling than as controlled. The Family and the Law makes even
more effective use of this device than the predecessor work.
One case which provides a focal point for most of Chapter I and part
of Chapter II involves a couple in early middle age, with three chil-
dren, embroiled in separation proceedings extending over an eight-year
period. At the time of their marriage and for a long period afterwards
both were Orthodox Jewish. The wife, however, was later converted
to the Christian Science faith. Her actions thereafter may have been
the cause of disruption, a symptom among others of the source of
disruption, or part of her contribution to the totality of husband-wife
conflict which gave rise to the litigation. The reader will have to make
up his own mind; the raw material for the decision is there in a way
unmatched in any other collection of legal materials on the family.
There are also three other interesting transcripts. One is from the
record of a divorce action based on adultery in which the wife claimed
that her husband had not only condoned but in effect encouraged the
liaison. The decision went against her, with further litigation about
whether she was a fit mother for the young daughters of the marriage
in light of her testimony about whether a woman might properly have
an extra-marital affair. A second is the record of a juvenile court pro-
10. DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 2.
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tective proceeding triggered by a breaking and entry by several juve-
niles. A third is an adoption case. All four cases together are instructive
in themselves, and provide an excellent medium for the incorporation
of the psychiatric materials in which The Family and the Law abounds.
I mentioned earlier several assumptions which the traditional law
of domestic relations appears to embody. There is little in orthodox
collections of teaching materials which encourages one to question
them. But The Family and the Law, drawing as it does as much on
non-legal sources as on legal, forces one to consider whether or to what
degree they are tenable. The net impact on (and from) my own thinking
runs along the following lines:
(1) The legal institution of the marriage ceremony and its aftermath
appears in traditional thinking to have magic operative effect. The
materials in The Family and the Law suggest that the key relationships
are already cemented before any official activity begins. The cere-
monials which make public the incipient marriage relationship to the
community have considerable importance, in that they feed the com-
munity's sense of ongoing ritual tradition and charge the couple with a
sense of responsibility outvard toward the group as well as inward
toward each other. There are also perhaps a number of worthwhile
practical advantages if the fact of marriage is spread on accessible public
records. But in either instance it is not the law or legal institutions
which are important, but society and its processes and individuals and
their interaction.
(2) Much legal doctrine appears to consider genital union the pri-
mary attribute of marriage. As an example one need only look at the
doctrine of condonation to adultery. A wife knowing of her husband's
adultery is to "fle(e) from him as a polluted being,""1 or else will be
held to her marriage to him. One act of intercourse is enough. The
Family and the Law suggests that sexual relationships themselves are
in a sense neutral so far as a value judgment is concerned, and that sex
can be used to attract, to repel, to hold and to combat a future or
present marital partner. But it is only one aspect of complex human
relationships. To some, to attack traditional legal dogma by presenting
data on human sexuality might appear to evidence a preoccupation
with sex, but to me it is the traditional judicial statement which is
obscene, not the resources gathered in The Family and the Law.
(3) A legally-sanctioned union can be dissolved only if one partner
is "guilty" or "at fault." A full array of materials both legal and non-
legal suggests that if this were the test and it were applied realistically,
11. Shadcleton v. Schackleton, 48 N.J. Eq. 364, 370, 21 A. 935 (1891).
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divorce would never be possible. "It takes two to tango," and no marital
rupture is totally caused by one spouse only. A judicial obsession with
fault, moreover, appears to promote dissolution of marriage rather than
reconciliation, in that it reinforces the very natural tendency to attrib-
ute fault elsewhere. Conciliation and attribution of "fault" are them-
selves irreconcilable.
(4) When dissolution is ordered, property settlements and monetary
payments are to be administered as rewards to the innocent and punish-
ment to the guilty. This collection ventilates this supposition in several
ways. Traditionally, the financial weapon is considered available to the
judge only when he finds a marriage once to have existed. If there was
no "marriage" as a matter of "law," the weapon is blunted except as a
woman is denied a claim to property which she and her mate amassed
together as punishment for her having entered into a "meretricious"
relationship in the first place. It is thus not a very effective coercive
weapon. Furthermore, a "guilty" ex-spouse or ex-mate, and particularly
an ex-wife, has to eat. If her former husband does not support her, the
state must or she starves. If the "guilty" one is the ex-husband, he
probably will not starve unless he is unemployable, but hardship will
be experienced by the second family unit which in a great many
instances he has already founded. There is no clear-cut solution to any
of these dilemmas, and everyone concerned, including the taxpayer,
suffers to some degree; but it is quite apparent that use of a "fault"
concept is about the least satisfactory basis of any on which to try to
construct a viable system of assets allocation.
(5) Children are creatures subservient to the adults who brought
them into existence. Courts and welfare agencies, though often speaking
of the "best interests of the child," are usually preoccupied with the
race, blood, religion and heredity of one or both of the biological
parents. If, however, one begins with the insights of sociology or psy-
chiatry, most of the concerns of the law are misplaced. For example,
child placement for adoption is often limited by considerations of
whether the natural mother (or parents) and the would-be adoptive
parents have the same religion. Viewed from medieval Rome or
Reformation-era Geneva or London, this might be all important, since
what matters is salvation of the child's soul and his redemption from
error, however hellish or stunted his temporal life may be. But if one's
concern is to lodge the child in an harmonious environment, the
primary consideration is that the parents share the same general out-
look, whether that be popularly cataloged as atheist, agnostic, Protes-
tant, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist or whatever. If the adoptive parents are
[V/ol. 75,504
REVIEWS
a member of a militant sect viewed as schismatic by much of the com-
munity in which the child will live, that is a relevant consideration, not
in terms of the propriety of the parents' religious belief, but because of
the impact that isolation from or persecution by the community itself
might have upon the child. The matter of marriages crossing racial,
national or economic lines should be viewed in exactly the same way.
Incipient clashes within and without the family should be identified
and compensated for as far as possible before they arise; even if the
adoptive parents are in a stable relationship, there is still the com-
munity to be taken account of. In all of this, the net impression is that
if the child, and not the three or four (or more) adults in actual or
potential relationship to him, were in fact our focus and his welfare
our primary aim, most of the existing law would be almost completely
rewritten.
(6) Legal doctrines shape human conduct. This both bolsters and is
a natural product of judicial egotism. A contrary supposition, which
The Family and the Law does much to support, is that people manage
to get what they want no matter what the law says, so long as personal
desire and legal mandate are in contradiction. The editors have a most
felicitous way of making this clear. In a great many instances in which
the appellate decision included in the book has been decided since
1955, counsel for both sides have been asked to supply information
about what happened after the close of litigation. In only a few in-
stances would it seem that the courts underwrote the expectations of
the parties and sent them on their way content. In most, either the
judicial mandate has been evaded, by migratory divorce or otherwise,
or there has been submission in form to the court's decree without any
substance to back it. Here, too, if we should set out to shape the law
to human processes, rather than the converse, family law would assume
a far different shape than it does.
(7) Other organs of government are to conform their practices to
standards laid down by judges. A more comprehensive view might lead
to a conclusion that most functional determinations are made by wel-
fare and other administrative agencies, and that judicial doctrine should
be shaped as far as possible to conform to policies generated and en-
forced in the executive branch. True, lawyers and judges are most
important as the means to preserve functional "due process" in the
machinery itself, but they are among the persons least qualified in the
community to determine the substantive coverage of formal norms
relating to the family.
In short, the format of The Family and the Law and the abundance
1966]
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of comparative material which it provides cannot help but promote a
living awareness of the limitations of law, and the scope of effective
utilization of law, in the regulation of the family. It is a work which
judge or lawyer can use in rethinking his own attitude toward the
desirability and limits of effectiveness of litigation involving the family.
Nevertheless, it is not intended primarily for this purpose, but instead
for instructional purposes. How effective a tool is it likely to be in the
classroom?
On the whole it opens the classroom window to the real world just as
its predecessor did for the field of substantive criminal law. Dr. Andrew
S. Watson and I have used Criminal Law for three years, and would not
be content to return to a traditional casebook. As of now we expect
the same thing to be true if we adopt The Family and the Law. But I
have one reservation which has strengthened as we have taught from
Criminal Law and which probably applies to the present work as well.
Both books have their primary impact because they abandon tradi-
tional classification and terminology and hammer home to the student
the idea that there are many other ways to analyze and attempt to solve
human problems than through the law. But this has its greatest effect
if the student is already aware of at least the outlines of traditional
classification and analysis in the law. In other words, a man does not
sail in the race from Port Huron to Mackinac Island until he has
learned to handle a Sailfish on an overgrown puddle. A student, or
for that matter a novice instructor, may encounter great difficulty in
tying, for example, flitting references to recrimination, affinity or
judicial separation into any conceptual structure which he will en-
counter as a lawyer. This is compounded by the fact that the editors in
pursuing other, and probably in the long term more important, goals
refer very little to law review material, treatises for the practitioner, or
other accessible legal writing. The lack of ties to tradition can produce
a level of frustration in the student almost as high as that created at
the other end of the spectrum when a law instructor summarily
squelches a student who expresses doubt about whether legal norms
are in fact meaningful or effective. Is there any way to cope with this?
It is my understanding that in teaching criminal law at Yale, using
Criminal Law, students are expected to consult regularly one or more
of the standard one-volume texts like Hall, Williams, Miller, Clark and
Marshall or Perkins. While these works vary in their quality, they
probably can provide the necessary background acquaintance with legal
tradition, particularly if students are told at what points in the course
certain portions of the texts are relevant. But this is not a very helpful
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device when it comes to family law. The only student text available
is hopelessly outdated,1 and the larger works are either pedestrian or
outdated, or both. He might find some help from law review articles,
but for the most part he will have to use the Index to Legal Periodicals
or a more orthodox casebook to find them. This can be a difficult order
to fill for a student laboring under a heavy load of courses and research.
I am inclined to believe that the solution lies in making use of
the developing technique of programmed instruction. A program,
properly drawn and tested, is a learning and teaching device much
superior to a text. It embodies an orderly progression of ideas in any
body of knowledge which can be broken down into principles, varia-
tions on principles and the mode of their application to specific prob-
lems. In other words, it does in a somewhat different format what the
case system is now supposed to do in a conservative law school cur-
riculum. The course in Family Law which I hope to develop, therefore,
is one in which during the first month or so the student works through
programmed material more or less at his own speed, probably with
no instructor contact at all for the moment. An objective examination
can then test the degree to which the student is able to make use of
orthodox language in traditional case settings. From that point on
classroom sessions will begin, with joint instruction by lawyer and
psychiatrist or sociologist based on whatever segments of The Family
and the Law the instructors find most useful to them in achieving the
aims of the course as they see it. Since the editors do not intend the
book to be covered as a whole in any one course,13 it does no violence
to their intent to use portions of it as the basis for an individualized
course. With a format like this, perhaps the student may have the best
of both worlds of scholarship, the traditional and the experimental.
In summary, The Family and the Law is a long overdue ventilation
of the stuffy field of family law, a Flapper to terminate "intense Specu-
lations." It may serve to bring teaching in that field into the twentieth
century, and in time to promote a more realistic mending of the
fractured family than our profession seems to achieve now. Lemuel
Gulliver would have approved.
B. J. GEORGE, JR.-
12. MADDEN, DomEsric RELATioNS (1931).
13. See p. vii.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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